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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California case law and legislation is a regu-
lar feature of the Women's Law Forum. The survey summarizes 
recent California Supreme Court decisions, courts of appeal de-
cisions, and new legislation which are of special importance to 
women. The focus of the survey is on presenting issues most per-
tinent to women, rather than on analyzing all issues raised in 
each case or bill. 
The survey period for cases in this issue is March 1, 1981 
through February 28, 1982. Summaries of significant legislation 
enacted between October 1, 1980 and December 31, 1981 are also 
included. 
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1. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. RAPE AND OTHER SEX OFFENSES 
1. Application of Statutory Rape Laws to Males 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), aff'g 25 
Cal. 3d 608 (1979). 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of California's statutory rape statute, Penal Code section 261.5, 
which prohibits males from engaging in sexual intercourse with 
females under the age of eighteen who are not their wives. The 
Court reaffirmed previous holdings that gender-based classifica-
tions need only be substantially related to an important govern-
ment interest to be valid. Using this test, the Court found that 
California has an interest in preventing the drastic medical and 
social costs accompanying teenage pregnancy. The statute was 
found to provide a rational method to equalize the risks and re-
spective costs of pregnancy. 
The defendant, charged with violating section 261.5, sought 
to set aside the information on the ground that the statute con-
stituted unconstitutional gender discrimination. Both the trial 
court and the court of appeal rejected the argumen,t. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed, holding this section did not vio-
late equal protection requirements. 
. The United State Supreme Court agreed with the California 
courts, but not with their analysis. While California recognizes 
gender classification as inherently suspect, the United States Su-
preme Court views sex classification cases as meriting only 
'sharper focus.' This approach, first stated in Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976), requires that gender-based legislation be sub-
stantially related to an important government interest to be con-
stitutionally valid. 
The Court stated that a deterrent for males was necessary 
to equalize the difference in cost reSUlting from underage sexual 
activity between a male, who causes pregnancy, and a teenage 
female, who bears the risks and responsibilities of pregnancy. 
Thus, the section operated to put both sexes at parity and 
achieved the legislative objective of preventing pregnancies that 
would drastically affect underage females. 
725 
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Defendant also contended that a gender-neutral statute 
would deter both sexes and eliminate any sex-based 
discrimination. 
The Court rejected this legislative rewrite, noting that 
under Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), a legislature is not 
required to delineate perfectly between the sexes. The court also 
found a gender-neutral statute would defeat the state's objective 
since females would be less likely to report offenses if they were 
to be punished to the same extent as males. 
Since the objective of section 261.5 is to prevent pregnancy, 
the male also argued the statute was overbroad because it pro-
hibited sexual relations with females too young to become preg-
nant. This argument was rejected as ridiculous because it would 
inconsistently 8llow sexual intercourse with young girls, only to 
punish it when they grew older. 
A final argument theorized that the statute wrongly pre-
sumed males to be the culpable party. However, the Court noted 
that the state objective was of overriding importance. The legis-
lature merely sought to achieve its objective through the most 
successful means. 
Justice Stewart, concurring, stressed that classifications ac-
cording to gender are permissible. He found the distinction obvi-
ous: Women, not men, become pregnant. Therefore, legislation 
attempting to avoid the horrible results of teenage pregnancy by 
classifying victims and offenders according to sex, is proper and 
constitutionally valid. 
Justice Blackmun, concurring, noted this case presents an 
acceptable means of prohibiting a minor's sexual activity be-
cause the crime occurs before a pregnancy has occurred. While 
Justice Blackmun would reject a . statute restricting a woman's 
procreative choice, the California penal code does not intrude on 
such a right. The statute is viewed as a rational means of achiev-
ing the state objective of reducing the number of teenage 
pregnancies. 
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall's dissenting opinion 
agreed that the test used in judging California's statute was 
Women's Law Forum 
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whether the classification is substantially related to an impor-
tant state objective. However,-according to the dissent, the state 
failed to show the link between the state objective and the . legis-
lative goal. 
Under Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 
U.S. 142 (1980), a state cannot meet the constitutional standard 
unless it proves that a gender-neutral statute would not operate 
as effectively as a gender-based one. The question, according to 
the dissent (and vital in proving a substantial relationship be-
tween a gender-based statute and its goal), is whether the stat-
ute deters females by punishing only males. California did not 
present evidence indicating that fewer statutory rapes occurred 
under this statute than would be true with a statute drafted to 
punish both male and female offenders. 
In concluding, the dissent noted that while the Court's ma-
jority advanced the prevention of pregnancy as the state's objec-
tive, California legislative history told a different story. Califor-
nia's statutory rape laws were premised on the legislator's view 
that an underage female is legally incapable of consenting to 
sexual intercourse. 
Justice Stevens' separate dissent pointed out the inconsis-
tency in the statute, presuming to specially protect females 
while allowing them to freely consent to the very activity from 
which they are protected. 
B. LEGISLATION 
1. Statutory Rape 
S.B. 322-Rains 
Chapter 29 
Statutes of 1981 
Statutory Rape Removed From Child Abuse Definition. This 
legislation removes Penal Code section 261 from the sexual assu-
alt definition of child abuse. Section 261 proscribes sexual inter-
course with a female, other than the perpetrator's wife, if she is 
under eighteen. 
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2. Sexual Assault 
S.B. 23-Watson 
Chapter 726 
Statutes of 1981 
Evidence of Rape Victim's Sexual Activity. Under Evidence 
Code section 782, evidence of a victim's sexual conduct with the 
defendant is admissible in a rape action for the purpose of at-
tacking the victim's credibility. This legislation extends admit-
tance of such evidence to other sexual crimes under the Penal 
Code. Evidence Code section 1103, which also allows introduc-
tion of a victim's sexual activity under special circumstances, 
was similarly amended. 
A.B. 208-Waters 
Chapter 527 
Statutes of 198i 
Sexual Assualt Advisory Committee. Penal Code section 1386 
sets up an advisory committee to aid district attorneys in the 
prosecution of sexual assault cases. This section amends the 
makeup of the advisory committee to include one member repre-
senting either a city police department, or sheriff's department. 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Effect of Dissolution Judgment on Quiet Title Action 
Badillo u. Badillo, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 177 Cal. Rptr. 56 
(4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a quiet title ac-
tion was properly barred by a default dissolution judgment 
which divided community property. The court also held a disso-
lution judgment reversible where distribution of community 
property was unequal and there was a timely appeal. 
The couple purchased a home, taking title as joint tenants. 
This property was listed as a community asset in the wife's dis-
solution petition. She obtained a default judgment awarding 
one-half the equity to each party. The husband's share was de-
ferred until the house was sold, and the wife was awarded use 
and occupancy in the interim. 
Ten years later the wife died intestate, leaving five children 
Women's Law Forum 
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as her heirs at law, and the residence as the bulk of her estate. 
The husband sued to quiet title, claiming the residence by right 
of survivorship under joint tenancy. The trial court denied the 
husband's motion, relying on the final dissolution judgment to 
estop the husband's action. 
The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the husband's argu-
ment that the final dissolution judgment violated Civil Code sec-
tion 580 by awarding the wife more than was requested in her 
pleadings. Civil Code section 4800 allows the court to value the 
community assets and to make a division and distribution in an 
equitable manner, absent a written agreement or settlement be-
tween the parties. Although the distribution was unequal be-
cause the husband's share was deferred until the property was 
sold, his failure to file a timely appeal rendered the judgment 
final. 
2. Tracing Separate Property Funds 
In re Marriage of Cadematori, 119 Cal. App. 3d 970, 174 
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that 
tracing the source of funds used in acquiring property by itself 
will rebut a community property presumption where title is 
taken jointly as husband and wife, and that the Lucas presump-
tion is not limited to single family dwellings. 
The wife appealed a dissolution judgment's determination 
that a warehouse was the husband's separate property. The 
commercial warehouse was purchased with funds the husband 
raised from sale of his separate property during the marriage 
and with the proceeds of a bank loan. The loan was repaid with 
rental income from the property; any surplus was deposited in a 
joint bank account. The deed listed title in names of both the 
husband and the wife. 
Under Civil Code section 5110, property acquired during 
marriage is presumed to be a community holding; The trial 
court overcame the presumption by tracing the funds used to 
purchase the warehouse to the sale of the husband's separate 
property. The trial court also found the husband intended no 
gift when title was taken as husband and wife. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, citing the Cali-
9
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fornia Supreme Court's decision of In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 
Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980) in which the 
community property presumption was distinguished from the 
situation where there was an express designation of title specify-
ing the form of ownership. 
Lucas determined that an express designation of ownership, 
e.g., taking of title as joint tenants, as in the present case, is 
inconsistent with an intention to retain a separate property in-
terest. A greater showing of intent, i.e., an express agreement or 
understanding, is necessary to overcome the strong community 
presumption. Here, there was no such agreement. 
The court of appeal noted that Lucas should be applied to 
any form of conveyance taken in both names, was not limited to 
joint tenancy, and that the Lucas presumption was not limited 
to single family dwellings. 
3. Employment Benefits Received After Separation 
In re Marriage 0/ Flockhart, 119 Cal. App. 3d 240, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 818 (lst Dist. 1981). A husband's "weekly layoff benefits" 
payment was held by the court of appeal to be separate property 
where such payment constituted present, rather than deferred 
compensation, and where the couple had separated prior to re-
ceipt of the payment. 
The wife appealed that portion of an interlocutory dissolu-
tion judgment declaring a weekly layoff benefit to be the hus-
band's separate property. He had lost his job after the couple's 
separation. The benefit was granted pursuant to the Redwood 
Employee Protection Program (REEP), which contained provi-
sions to maintain income for employees directly affected by the 
expansion of the Redwood National Park. The court of appeal 
affirmed. 
In In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), the California Supreme Court ruled 
that property attributable to community earnings was to be di-
vided equally upon dissolution. The court of appeal distin-
guished the Brown form of community property (deferred com-
pensation based upon the contractual rights of marriage) from 8 
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form of benefit payment resulting from present status. The 
Flockhart court relied on In re Marriage of McDonald, 52 Cal. 
App. 3d 509, 125 Cal. Rptr. 160 (2d Dist. 1975), which found 
that a worker's compensation award received after separation 
was a form of benefit based upon present status, therefore sepa-
rate property. Here, the court determined that the husband's 
weekly benefits payments were based upon the husband's status 
as an affected employee under the provisions of the REEP. 
4. Gifts Used to Purchase and Improve Residence 
In re Marriage of Gonzales, 116 Cal. App. 3d 556, 172 Cal. 
Rptr. 179 (1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that where 
title in a home is taken by husband and wife as joint tenants, 
the home is presumed community property unless a different in-
tent is expressed in the instrument granting title, or unless an 
agreement or understanding of an intent to retain separate 
property status exists. 
The husband and wife purchased a home, taking title as 
joint tenants. The wife's father contributed $20,000 toward 
purchase and improvement of the home. 
The trial court found insufficient evidence to show the con-
tribution represented gifts to both parties, and found that the 
joint tenancy was merely a product of financial practices at the 
time of the purchase. The trial court determined the family 
dwelling was to be distributed according to community and sep-
arate property interests involved. 
The parties were treated as tenants in common, the hus-
band receiving 20.7%, and the wife 79.3 % of the home's value. 
The wife was awarded use of the property; sale of the home was 
ordered upon the eighteenth birthday of the couple's youngest 
child. In addition, the court reserved jurisdiction to modify the 
award. 
The husband appealed distribution of the family dwelling. 
The court of appeal reversed the lower court's ruling on the 
party's respective interests and barred the wife's reimbursement 
for separate property funds contributed for improvements. The 
ruling was based on the wife's failure to show any intent to re-
tain a separate property interest as required to rebut the pre-
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sumption of Civil Code section 5110, that property held in joint 
tenancy is community property for dissolution purposes, under 
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 853 (1980). 
5. Community Presumption of Home Acquired During 
Marriage 
In re Marriage of Hayden, 124 Cal. App. 3d 72, 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 183 (4th Dist., 1981). The court of appeal held that absent 
an agreement to the contrary, a home purchased as community 
property, with title taken as husband and wife, must be divided 
equally upon diss<¥ution without regard to the source of funds 
used for the down payment. A residence acquired during mar-
riage is presumed community property absent an agreement or 
understanding to the contrary, and tracing the source of funds 
used to purchase the property is unnecessary and improper, ac-
cording to the court. In addition, the same rebuttable presump-
tion of community property arises where a separate savings ac-
count is changed to a joint account. 
The husband and wife each acquired separate property as a 
result of their illinois marital dissolution. They remarried four 
months after final judgment. The husband's title in his separate 
property was changed to reflect a joint tenancy. The wife sold 
her property and deposited the money in a separate savings ac-
count. When marital problems arose again, she moved to Cali-
fornia and transferred her money to a separate account here. 
The husband soon followed, after selling his home in illinois. 
Upon his arrival in California, he deposited approximately 
$100,000 into the wife's separate account, which was later 
changed to a joint account. The couple bought a home using the 
husband's $100,000 from the joint account and $5,000 of the 
wife's funds. Title was taken in both names, as husband and 
wife and cOJ]lmunity property. Dissolution proceedings began 
three months later. 
The trial court found the joint bank account was the wife's 
separate property,. and the home was community property. 
There was no evidence of an agreement that either spouse would 
get less than a one-half interest in the home. However, the court 
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ordered reimbursement of the share each contributed towards 
the down payment. The husband received $100,000 and the wife, 
$5,000, based on a finding that the parties had not intended re-
ciprocal gifts. The court of appeal reversed. The nature of the 
bank account was remanded for further consideration. 
Citing In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 
285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980), the court of appeal noted that 
division of community property is to be equal, barring evidence 
of an agreement or understanding to the contrary. Since the trial 
court found no agreement, the court's reimbursement scheme 
was incorrect. 
The same principle was applied to the bank account funds. 
A transfer from separate to joint ownership invoked the rebutta-
ble presumption of a community holding. Since there was no 
showing in the record of any agreement that the funds were to 
remain the wife's separate property, the matter was remanded 
for further investigation. 
6. Award of Community Corporation 
In re Marriage of Lotz, 120 Cal. App. 3d 379, 174 Cal. Rptr. 
618 (2d Dist. 1981). Where parties to a marital dissolution own a 
closely held corporation, determination of the corporation's mar-
ket value cannot be based on a formula used in valuing a pub-
licly held corporation, according to a decision of the court of ap-
peal for the Second District. The court also held that evidence 
of a covenant not to compete, regarding a future corporate sale, 
could be used in valuing corporate goodwill and did not restrict 
the husband's post-marital conduct. 
During their marriage, the parties amassed community 
property worth $1,200,000. Upon separation, community prop-
erty consisted primarily of a closely held corporation and the 
couple's residence. The community's corporate stock was valued 
at $469,000, and their home was valued at $408,000. 
The trial court awarded the residence to the wife and the 
corporate stock to the husband. A loan from the corporation to 
the husband was included in the community's valuation. 
The trial court increased 1977 pre-tax earnings of $47,969 
13
Modena-Kurpinsky: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
734 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:725 
by $24.000. then multiplied that figure by seven to arrive at a 
valuation of corporate stock. The total figure of $469.000 consti-
tuted the community stock's market value. The multiplier used 
in the evaluation is commonly used in valuing publicly held cor-
porations. Included in the total worth was corporate goodwill. a 
figure which included a covenant not to compete. and other cor-
porate assets. 
The husband appealed the interlocutory judgment. contend-
ing the court incorrectly valued the close corporation. based on 
In re Marriage of Foster. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 
(lst Dist. 1974), and that the covenant not to compete was im-
properly considered. He also argued the court abused its discre-
tion, in requiring that he purchase his wife's corporate stock 
against his wishes. The husband maintained the business could 
continue under'joint control. since the nature of the corporation 
was commercial rather than professional. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, upholding the 
trial court's valuation of corporate goodwill, but disapproving its 
formula for calculating market value. The vast differences be-
tween the nature of public and private corporations precluded 
effective use of the common multiplier. 
Civil Code section 48OO(b)(1) authorizes an award of any as-
set to one party to effect an equal division of community prop-
erty. The court of appeal noted this section gave the trial court 
considerable discretion under In re Marriage of Connolly. 23 
Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1977); and In re 
Marriage of Emmett, 109 Cal. App. 3d 753, 169 Cal. Rptr. 473 
(2d Dist. 1980). 
The court of appeal remanded the question of stock divi-
sion, ordering the lower court to inquire into the possibility of 
the couple's joint corporate control. Economic as well as emo-
tional factors were to be analyzed. 
B. CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
1. Modification of Out-of-State Custody Award 
In re Marriage of Leonard. 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 903 (lst Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held personal ju-
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risdiction over both parents is not required for a binding cus· 
tody determination under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic· 
tion Act (UCCJA) (Civil Code sections 5150·5174). T~e court 
also held that as long as the non·resident parent has been noti· 
fied and given an opportunity to be heard, California courts 
have jurisdiction to modify a foreign child custody decree under 
section 5163.1. Thus, California courts need not defer jurisdic· 
tion to the state where the custody decree originated. 
The parties divorced in Georgia. By agreement, the wife ob· 
tained custody of their daughter, subject to reasonable visitation 
by the husband. He moved to California. The child visited him 
in California and stayed through the school year. 
The father sought modification of the Georgia custody order 
in California. Prior to being personally served in Georgia, the 
wife kidnapped her daughter, returning to Georgia. The hus· 
band retaliated in kind and returned to California. 
The wife appeared specially to quash service or to have the 
action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found 
that the wife was adequately notified and that tlie California 
court should assume jurisdiction pursuant to Civil Code section 
5152.1(b) which allows California courts jurisdiction if in the 
child's best interests, if the child has a significant connection 
with the state, and if evidence important in determining present 
or future care is in the state. 
The wife's motion for reconsideration was denied as were 
actions before the appellate and Supreme Court of California. 
The trial court modified the Georgia custody award by granting 
custody to the husband, with conditional visitation privileges to 
the wife. The court of appeal affirmed. 
Both parties agreed that the jurisdictional requirements of 
Civil Code section 5152 were satisfied because the child had 
been in California for six months prior to commencement of the 
trial. However, the wife argued that personal jurisdiction was 
necessary to affect a binding custody modification, citing May v. 
Anderson, 345 U.S. 928 (1953). In May the husband filed for 
divorce in Wisconsin and had the wife personally served in Ohio. 
She failed to appear at trial. The Wisconsin court granted the 
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divorce and awarded custody to husband. The wife took the 
children to Ohio for a visit and refused to return them. The hus-
band sought a writ of habeas corpus in Ohio for the children's 
return. 
The Ohio court stated that the Wisconsin decree should be 
given full faith and credit and granted the husband's writ. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the 
Wisconsin decree had been decided without personal jurisdiction 
over the wife, full faith recognition was not required. 
The court of appeal distinguished May by noting that while 
full faith and credit of the California decision is not required 
where the wife is not under personal jurisdiction of the court, 
May does not prohibit recognition as a means of comity. The 
UCCJA provides a network through which states mutually agree 
to assure that the resolution of a child custody dispute takes 
place in the state with the closest connection to the child. 
2. Constitutionality of Parental Rights Termination 
Statute 
In re Paula P., 123 Cal. App. 3d 734, 176 Cal. Rptr. 708 (2d 
Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that Civil Code section 
232, under which minors may be declared free of parental con-
trol upon a showing of cruelty or neglect, is not unconstitutional 
for vagueness. The terms "cruel" and "neglectful" have simple 
definitions clarified by the legislature, said the court. 
Paula P., born a heroin addict because of her mother's ad-
diction, was removed from her mother's custody one week after 
birth. The minor was declared a dependent child under Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 6oo(a) and 600(d) (currently sec-
tions 3OO(a) and 3OO(d». She was initially placed with her pater-
nal grandmother, later in foster care. At no time did her mother 
visit or provide support. The foster parents, seeking to adopt the 
child, filed a petition under Civil Code section 232 to declare her 
free of parental control. The foster parents alleged the mother 
had abandoned the child at birth, meriting termination of her 
parental rights. 
The trial court awarded custody to the foster parents based 
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on its finding of cruelty and neglect, concluding that the foster 
parents were better able to promote the child's best interests. 
The natural mother appealed. 
The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the natural mother's 
argument that the terms "cruel" and "neglectful" in section 232 
were vague and that the section was therefore unconstitutional. 
The decision in In re Sherman M., 39 Cal. App. 3d 40, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 847 (2d Dist. 1974) found the terms "habit" or "habitual" 
were not vague because they were simple words with easily ac-
cessibly definitions. The court of appeal applied the same rea-
soning to "cruel" and "neglectful", concluding that neither term 
was vague. 
3. Child's Right to Compel Parent's Visitation 
Louden v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 565, 173 Cal. Rptr. 447 
(2d Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1982). The court of 
appeal held. that a child cannot compel visits by her noncus-
todial parent through a court order. 
A child, represented by her mother, brought an action alleg-
ing her father had a duty to visit her, but had failed to do so. 
The child's mother had never married the father; the child lived 
with her mother and received support from the father as result 
of a paternity action. 
The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion, and independently ordered the file on the action sealed. In 
affirming the lower court's action, the court of appeal noted that 
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), Civil Code section 7000, does 
not give a child the right to compel visitation. 
The child sought to have the ruling in Griffith v. Gibson, 73 
Cal. App. 3d 465, 142 Cal. Rptr. 176 (4th Dist. 1977), applied 
reciprocally to her. The court in Griffith had interpreted the 
UP A as extending visitation rights to a father of a child born out 
of wedlock, regardless of the current marital status of the par-
ents. The Louden court declined such application, because Grif-
fith extended the right to fathers, not children. 
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4. Prohibiting Children From Living In Condominium 
Complex 
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners' Association,t 123 Cal. 
App. 3d 789, 177 Cal. Rptr. 159 (2d Dist. 1981), hearing granted, 
Nov. 27, 1981. A condominium covenant limiting residency to 
individuals over the age of eighteen was held valid and enforcea-
ble by the court of appeal. Such age discrimination is neither 
prohibited by the California or United States Constitutions and 
is not unreasonable nor arbitrary, according to the court. 
A husband and wife bought the condominium in question 
and later had a child. When the condominium association noti-
fied them of its intent to enforce the covenant, the couple filed 
this action seeking invalidation of the restriction. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. 
The court of appeal upheld the covenant, finding no state 
action involved. Although Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 
held that judicial enforcement of a private covenant constituted 
state action, there was no specific prohibition in either the 
United States or California Constitutions against age discrimina-
tion, thus there was no constitutional violation. 
The court noted that because age was excluded as a pro-
tected class in housing statutes, whereas it was included in em-
ployment legislation, the legislature must have intended that age 
was not a protected class in the housing area. Support for this 
inference was found in the court of appeal decision in Ritchey v. 
Villa Nueva Condominium Association, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 
146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (lst Dist. 1978), which involved a similar cov-
enant. The court in Ritchey stated that a condominium associa-
tion had the implied right and authority to regulate activities 
which would disturb the entire group. Here, the court found that 
children could provide a disturbance and that regulation of resi-
dency on the basis of age to protect the entire group of home-
owners was not unreasonable nor arbitrary. 
t Since the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in this case. the court of 
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any 
principle of law. Pince v. Marr. 47 Cal. 2d 159.301 P.2d 837 (1956); Knouse v. Nimocka. 
8 Cal. 2d 482. 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This cue appeara in this Survey solely to familiarize 
the reader with issues pending before the high court. 
Women's Law Forum 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/8
1982] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 739 
5. Admissibility of Medical Records to Determine Extent 
of Visitation Rights 
Simek v. Simek, 117 Cal. App. 3d 169, 172 Cal. Rptr. 564 
(lst Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that disclosure of 
records, protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, may 
not be compelled to demonstrate a parent suffers from emo-
tional problems which would preclude visitation rights. 
Pursuant to a dissolution, the wife was granted custody of 
her two minor children. A visitation schedule for the husband 
was never agreed upon. The husband later sought extensive visi-
tation privileges and the wife petitioned for termination of the 
husband's visitation rights until his emotional status was 
determined. 
The wife subpoenaed her former husband's psychiatric 
records, alleging he had been treated two years earlier for a 
mental breakdown, and one year earlier for a suicide attempt. 
The trial court denied the husband's motion to quash. The 
records were sealed and delivered to the court for inspection at 
the visitation hearing. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence 
Code section 1014 extends the physician-patient privilege to 
communications between a patient and psychotherapist. 
The wife argued that by seeking extensive visitation rights 
the husband had tendered his mental condition as an issue, 
thereby triggering the exception set forth in Evidence Code sec-
tions 996 and 1016. However, the court of appeal found this ex-
ception can be invoked only where patients have initiated an ac-
tion in which they voluntarily disclose the information, and 
cited Koshman v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 294, 168 Cal. 
Rptr. 588 (3d Dist. 1980). The court noted that the privilege is 
stronger in visitation cases because visitation rights are a matter 
of natural right to a non-custodial parent. Feist v. Feist, 236 Cal. 
App. 2d 433, 46 Cal. Rptr. 93 (4th Dist. 1965). The court found 
that a waiver of privilege based upon the husband's assertion of 
his natural right to visitation was anomalous. 
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C. SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Automatic Reduction of Child Support 
Comstock v. Comstock, 116 Cal. App. 3d 481, 172 Cal. Rptr. 
148 (5th Dist. 1981). The Court of appeal found a court-ordered 
child'support obligation could not be reduced proportionately by 
the number of children having reached majority or becoming 
emancipated. 
The wife sought unpaid child support based on a dissolution 
judgment entered in South Dakota and registered in California. 
The South Dakota decree established monthly child support un-
til the five children came of age. At the time of the hearing, all 
but one child was emancipated. 
The trial court found for the wife but determined that sup-
port payments would be reduced proportionately for each child 
having reached the age of majority. 
The court of appeal remanded for modification based on the 
wife's financial circumstances. The court relied on Spivey v. 
Furtado, 242 Cal. App. 2d 259, 51 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1st Dist. 1966), 
which held that child support awards should not be reduced pro-
portionately merely because a child has reached majority. 
The court of appeal determined the South Dakota decree 
was modifiable, both in terms of installments past due and pay-
ments becoming due, under Rudd v. Gerker, 67 S.D. 534, 295 
N.W. 491 (1940). The court's authority to modify the South Da-
kota decree came from Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 
283 P.2d 19 (1955), where it was held that a foreign dissolution 
decree could be the basis of a California judgment for unpaid 
support. Under Worthley, a foreign order could be modified in 
California courts to the extent it could be modified in the state 
of original decree. 
2. Constitutionality of Agreement for Entry of Child Sup-
port Judgment 
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 
988, 177 Cal. Rptr. 70 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held 
that County of Ventura v. Castro, 93 Cal. App. 3d 462, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 66 (2d Dist. 1979), which found Welfare and Institutions 
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Code section 11476.1 to be unconstitutional, could not be ap-
plied retroactively. Section 11476.1 authorized a district attor-
ney to enter into an agreement with a non-custodial parent for 
the entry of a child support judgment. 
The district attorney of Los Angeles County entered agree-
ments with several putative fathers whereby they agreed to pay 
child support. These agreements were entered as judgments pur-
suant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1. In Cas-
tro, the court of appeal held this section unconstitutional for not 
providing obligees with notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
the absence of an informed waiver of their constitutional right. 
Castro expressly declined to address the ruling'S retroactivity. 
When the putative fathers failed to make payments ordered 
by the judgments, the district attorney filed contempt charges. 
The fathers petitioned to vacate the child support judgments, 
citing Castro. Their motion was granted. The district attorney 
appealed. 
The court of appeal ordered the trial court to reinstate the 
judgments against the fathers. The court held Castro did not ap-
ply retroactively, citing Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 
226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979). In Salas, the California Supreme 
Court allowed indigent defendants in a paternity suit the right 
to counsel. However, this right applied only to final judgments 
as of the date of Salas. The California Supreme Court stated 
that the establishment of obligations and familial ties resulting 
from final judgment on child support necessitated a denial of 
retroactivity of the Salas holding. 
The court here also noted the important public interest in 
protecting finality of judgments and reliance interests of those 
affected by such judgments. Additionally, it noted an adminis-
trative nightmare would result were Castro given retroactive 
application. 
3. Modification of Marital Settlement Agreement 
Fukuzaki v. Superior Court, 120' Cal. App. 3d 454, 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 536 (3d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that Civil 
Code section 4811, covering modification of child or spousal sup-
port, allows the court to retain jurisdiction to modify the terms 
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of a marital settlement agreement unless the settlement agree-
ment specifically disallows modification. 
On separation, husband and wife entered into a settlement 
agreement providing for spousal support and waiving all other 
rights of the parties. The agreement appeared to be a final dis-
position of the parties' rights and obligations and was incorpo-
rated into the dissolution judgment. There was never any refer-
ence to modification of support. 
The wife later sought to modify the support provision. The 
trial court's jurisdiction was based upon the terms of the settle-
ment agreement. The husband's petition to nullify the modifica-
tion was granted. 
The court of appeal dismissed the husband's petition. Al-
though the couple's agreement was silent as to modification, it 
did not waive the requirements of Civil Code section 4811(b) 
which allows modification by court order absent a written agree-
ment to the contrary. 
4. Determination of Age of Majority for Support 
In re Marriage of Golden, 123 Cal. App. 3d 567, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. 807 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a child's 
age of majority for support purposes is twenty-one for orders is-
sued prior to March 4, 1972. Civil Code section 25.1 outlines leg-
islative intent concerning use of the term "age of majority." The 
section notes that after March 4, 1972, the age of majority de-
creased from twenty-one to eighteen. 
An interlocutory decree of dissolution issued November 26, 
1971 provided for support of the couple's three children "until 
the age of majority." The final decree was issued July 19, 1972. 
The wife petitioned to increase child support. At the time of her 
motion, the children were all between the ages of 18 and 21. The 
husband argued his support obligation ended when the youngest 
child turned eighteen since the final decree had been issued af-
ter the change in the age of majority. 
The husband theorized that the interlocutory decree merged 
with the final decree and was therefore superceded. The trial 
court rejected this argument, determining the applicable age of 
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majority to be twenty-one. The court of appeal affirmed, holding 
that the interlocutory decree is a final adjudication on all issues 
decided unless vacated. Therefore, the date of the interlocutory 
decree controlled. 
5. Conflict Over Age of Majority For Child Support 
Purposes 
In re Marriage of Taylor, 122 Cal. App. 3d 209, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 716 (2d Dist. 1981). Out-of-state support orders decreeing 
that accrued installments are not modifiable are entitled to full 
faith and credit in California courts under the exact terms of the 
foreign court's order, according to the court of appeal. The court 
also held that an action seeking enforcement of a support order 
under provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (URESA) does not operate as a waiver of constitu-
tional full faith and credit protections. 
The Taylor marriage was dissolved in Missouri. The judg-
ment ordered the husband to support the children until the age 
of majority. He moved to California, and the wife registered her 
Missouri judgment in California under provisions of Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1698.3, the URESA. When the wife 
moved for a computation of the support arrearage, the husband 
argued that California's age of majority (18) should be used for 
computation purposes, instead of Missouri's age of majority (21). 
The trial court recognized the Missouri judgment and or-
dered the husband to continue support payments for two chil-
dren between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The court of 
appeal affirmed. 
The California Supreme Court decision in Biewend v. 
Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P .2d 701 (1941), was noted by the 
court of appeal as similar to the case at bar. In Biewend, a wife 
sought enforcement of a Missouri alimony judgment in Califor-
nia. Under California law, alimony would have terminated upon 
the wife's remarriage. The Biewend court held that the Missouri 
judgment was enforceable under the United States Constitu-
tion's full faith and credit clause, provided the accrued install-
ments were not subject to modification by the court of original 
jurisdiction. 
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The husband nevertheless sought to limit the wife's URESA 
remedy by narrowing the judgment's enforcement to the proce-
dures outlined in Code of Civil Procedure section 1670, which 
defines the husband's duties as those under the state in which 
the husband was present when support was due. The husband 
argued his duties thus came under California law and that they 
extended only until his children reached their eighteenth birth-
day. The court of appeal found this argument unpersuasive, rea-
soning that section 1670 is an extension, not a restriction of sup-
port duties. 
6. Modification of Support Based Upon Current 
Circumstances 
In re Marriage of Thomas, 120 Cal. App. 3d 33, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 844 (4th Dist. 1981). Where a couple stipulated to child 
support, without detailing their financial circumstances, the 
court of appeal allowed modification without showing a change 
in circumstances. 
The wife was awarded custody of three minor children in an 
interlocutory dissolution judgment, and her husband was or-
dered to pay child support. Their financial status was not 
presented to the court. 
The husband's request for modification of child support was 
granted. The wife appealed, arguing her husband failed to prove 
a change in circumstances justifying modification. 
The court of appeal affirmed the modification. Under Moore 
v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293 (2d Dist. 1969), 
modification does not require a change in circumstances; it can 
be based on current financial circumstances. Absent evidence of 
financial circumstances at dissolution, evidence of current cir-
cumstances assessing child support payments was proper, ac-
cording to the court. 
The court noted that such modifications can be avoided by 
showing relevant facts on which the original order was based. 
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7. Automatic Wage Assignment Upon Default of Support 
Payments 
LeClaire v. LeClaire, 118 Cal. App. 3d 931, 173 Cal. Rptr. 
740 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that when child 
support payments are two months in arrears in a twenty-four 
month period, the trial court must allow a wage assignment 
under Civil Code section 4701(b). 
The husband was $900 in arrears in child support which in-
cluded nonpayment for at least two of the previous twenty-four 
months. The wife filed a motion for wage assignment. The hus-
band responded with a declaration stating his inability to pay 
and his opposition to the assignment on the grounds that it 
might adversely affect his employment. The wife's motion for as-
signment was denied by the trial court without giving any 
reasons. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded based on its in-
terpretation of Civil Code section 4701, which sets out statutory 
requirements for wage assignments. Section 4701 provides for 
assignments which "may" be ordered in subdivision (a), and in 
subdivision (b), authorizes mandatory assignments when certain 
conditions are met. Mandatory assignments are provided to in-
sure timely payments to children and to provide for swift access 
to the courts with a minimum of procedure, under In re Mar-
riage of DeMore, 93 Cal. App. 3d 785, 155 Cal. Rptr. 899 (lst 
Dist. 1979). 
Civil Code section 4701(b) mandates wage assignment where 
child support was ordered by the court and where the parent so 
ordered is in arrears in payment in an amount equal to two 
months payment within a twenty-four month period preceding 
the submission of a petition for assignment. 
8. Enforcement of Spousal Support Judgment 
Liebow v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 573, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 26 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that an Ohio 
money judgment for unpaid spousal support registered in Cali-
fornia was enforceable under the Sister State and Foreign 
Money Judgment Act (SSFMJ), Code of Civil Procedure section 
1710.10, rather than under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal En-
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forcement of Support Act of 1968 (RURESA). 
A marital settlement agreement entered into in Ohio by 
husband and wife provided for the wife's support. The wife ob-
tained a final money judgment in Ohio for the $6,025 in arrears. 
Following the husband's move to California, the wife registered 
her money judgment in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1710.10 (SSFMJ). Registration under this section gave 
the Ohio judgment the same effect and enforceability as a Cali-
fornia money judgment. 
The husband's motion to stay execution was granted. The 
court reasoned enforcement of the Ohio judgment was only 
proper under RURESA. The wife petitioned for an alternative 
writ. 
The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its or-
der staying enforcement and to grant the wife's motion for re-
consideration. The court then ordered denial of the husband's 
motion for a protective order preventing levy of the money 
judgment. 
Initially, the court noted the husband incorrectly challenged 
enforcement of the judgment in California. Under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1710.40, a spouse can move to vacate an order 
but cannot file an ex parte application for stay of execution as 
the husband did. The result, however, was unaffected and en-
forcement was nullified. For purposes of analysis, the court of 
appeal assumed the wife's judgment had been vacated. 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1710(c) defines an SSFMJ 
judgment as that part of any judgment requiring payment of 
money; it does not include support orders as defined in section 
1653(k). That section defines support orders as judgments in 
favor of an obligee whether temporary, final, subject to modifica-
tion, revocation or remission. The court of appeal found the 
wife's Ohio money judgment was a final, liquidated judgment 
not subject to modification which was therefore enforceable 
under SSFMJ. 
The court read the phrase "or subject to modification" in 
section 1653(k) to effectively and legally mean "and subject to 
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modification." In addition, the court found that United States 
Constitution Article IV, section 1, required the California legis-
lature to give full faith and credit to the wife's judgment since 
she had reduced the unpaid support obligation to a money 
judgment. 
9. Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Parent in Support 
Action 
McGlothen v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 106, 175 
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1st Dist. 1981), modified, rehearing denied, 121 
Cal. App. 3d 970b (1981). The court of appeal affirmed jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident and ordered spousal support where the 
non-resident's abandonment of his wife and child burdened the 
California welfare system. The court found the defendant had 
sufficient connections with California to allow jurisdiction. 
The husband was employed by the Chicago Cubs baseball 
team. He closed the couple's joint checking and savings account 
and refused to support his wife and two sons. After moving to 
California, the wife was forced to obtain welfare. She petitioned 
the court for child and spousal support from her husband. 
As a non-resident, the husband appeared specially to object 
to the court's jurisdiction. His motion to quash for lack of juris-
diction was denied. The husband petitioned for an alternative 
writ of mandate. The court of appeal denied the peremptory 
writ and discharged the alternative writ. 
Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10 authorizes California 
courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with 
the constitutions of California or the United States. The stan-
dard measure of proper jurisdiction is reasonableness, consider-
ing the relationship of a non-resident with the state under 
Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. 
Rptr. 586 (1977), reversed on other grounds, 463 U.S. 84 (1978); 
Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. 
Rptr. 352 (1976). 
The court of appeal found the facts similar to those of In re 
Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (4th 
Dist. 1979). There, the husband abandoned his wife and child in 
New Mexico forcing them to move in with relatives in California 
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and obtain welfare. The Lantos court found that the husband 
compelled the wife's move, and that he benefitted by having the 
state take on his financial duties. By exercising in personam ju-
risdiction over the husband, the court was able to enter a judge-
ment for child and spousal support. 
The McGlothen court found that the husband in this case 
had also caused the state to take on his financial responsibilities. 
Applying Lantos, the court concluded that its exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the husband was appropriate and did not 
offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
required by World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. u. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286 (1980). 
10. Parent's Custodial Care of Children's Assets 
Newman u. Newman, 123 Cal. App. 3d 618, 176 Cal. Rptr. 
723 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that the parents' 
duty to support minor children is different from their role as 
custodians. The court held that under Civil Code section 
1158(b), a father could not use stock dividend payments belong-
ing to his minor children, and over which he was custodian, to 
pay support obligations. 
A dissolution decree ordered the father to pay monthly 
child support and the two minor children's medical and dental 
bills. The interlocutory decree also made him holder and custo-
dian of stock certificates issued in his name for the health, edu-
cation and welfare of the children. 
The wife sought payment from the father for medical bills 
and child support plus an accounting of dividends received on 
the stocks, and transfer of certificates to her control. The father 
had kept no records of the dividends, which he used to help pay 
support. 
The trial court found the father's use of the stock dividends 
was within the meaning of the interlocutory decree and there-
fore proper. 
The court of appeal reversed, disagreeing with the trial 
court's interpretation of the interlocutory decree. The matter 
was remanded for redetermination under Civil Code section 
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1158(b). Section 1158(b) states that a custodian shall expend for 
a minor's benefit, so much of the custodial property as neces-
sary, with or without regard to the duty of himself or any other 
person to support the minor. The court of appeal found the trial 
court's interpretation of the interlocutory decree directly vio-
lated the custodial duty imposed in section 1158(b). 
D. DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS 
1. Untimely Request for Attorney's Fees 
In re Marriage of Kasper,t 117 Cal. App. 3d 118, 172 Cal. 
Rptr. 449 (5th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a mo-
tion for attorney fees and costs on appeal in connection with a 
dissolution proceeding was untimely because it was made after 
judgment on appeal was final. 
The wife filed a memorandum of costs on appeal two days 
after remittitur of the court of appeal decision regarding her dis-
solution was filed with the county. The wife's declaration sup-
porting her motion was made twelve days after filing the memo. 
She was awarded attorney's fees. 
The court of appeal reversed, based on the legislative intent 
of Civil Code section 4370(a) which provides that a court may 
order payment of court costs and attorney fees in a dissolution 
proceeding. The court found no reference in this section to fees 
after a proceeding is no longer pending. Bruce v. Bruce, 160 Cal. 
28, 116 P. 66 (1911), defined pendency as the time from com-
mencement of a dissolution action until final determination 
upon appeal, or until time for appeal has passed. Here, the court 
found the wife's motion for attorney's fees was untimely because 
it was made after judgment on the husband's appeal was final. 
2. Exclusion From Family Residence 
In re Marriage of Parker, 118 Cal. App. 3d 291, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 356 (2d Dist. 1981), modified, 119 Cal. App. 3d 448a 
(1981). The court of appeal held that sole and exclusive use of a 
t The California Supreme Court denied hearing this case and ordered the opinion 
not published May 27, 1981. Under CAL. CT. R. 977 this opinion may not be cited to any 
court. The case appears in the Survey solely to familiarize the reader with the issues 
presented. 
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family residence could not be granted prior to dissolution unless 
the excluded spouse had assaulted or threatened to assault the 
other spouse and physical or emotional harm to someone in the 
household would otherwise result. 
The husband appealed an order during a dissolution pro-
ceeding excluding him from his family residence. The trial court 
had awarded the wife temporary physical custody of the chil-
dren allowing her sole and exclusive use of the couple's home as 
custodial parent. The court issued the order pursuant to Civil 
Code section 5102 which allows temporary exclusion of either 
party to a dissolution proceeding from the family residence. 
The court of appeal reversed. At the time of the order, 
dwelling exclusions were authorized merely upon showing physi-
cal or emotionat harm would otherwise result. However, Civil 
Code section 5102 was amended to allow the court to grant ex-
clusive use of the family residence to a party in a dissolution 
proceeding only after a showing of physical assault or threat of 
assault. Where there is a substantial change made in a code sec-
tion, such as here, current law controls under the holding of 
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 
(1975). 
3. Award of Business Name on Dissolution 
In re Marriage of Shelton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 811, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 629 (3d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held, inter alia, 
that the issue of whether award of a business name in a dissolu-
tion action constitutes unfair competition is a question of fact. 
Since nothing in the record on review supported a conclusion of 
unfair competition, the husband's motion for modification of a 
dissolution award was properly denied. 
During their marriage, the couple established the Shelton 
Realty Company. Upon dissolution, the trial court awarded the 
business to the husband, subject to the right of the wife to use 
the name Fran Shelton Realty in any new real estate business. 
The husband filed a motion requesting modification of this 
award. He sought to deny his wife use of the name awarded or 
any other name similar to Shelton Realty. The trial court denied 
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his motion. 
The court of appeal noted that the likelihood of confusion 
between trade names is a question of fact under the holding of 
Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367 (4th 
Dist. 1963). 
The court also reasoned that the relief sought by the hus-
band could be obtained under a proceeding brought under Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 14330. That section provides 
injunctive relief for likely injury to business reputation, notwith-
standing the absence of competition between parties or the ab-
sence of confusion as to the source of goods and services. 
The court of appeal also held that a car bought by the hus-
band with money accumulated through gambling, was commu-
nity property. Where the husband's contribution towards the 
winnings was minimal and the community's contribution sub-
stantial, the entire winnings would be considered community 
property. 
One year after the couples' separation, but prior to the in-
terlocutory dissolution judgment, the husband withdrew $500 
from the community's bank account and sold community per-
sonal property for $9,500. Using the community's $10,000 as a 
stake, he won $22,000 at the Nevada gaming tables, then bought 
a $32,000 Ferrari automobile with his winnings and the commu-
nity's $10,000. 
The trial court held that the $32,000 used to buy the Ferrari 
was community property and that the wife was entitled to 
$16,000 of the asset. The court of appeal affirmed, citing 
Kershman v. Kershman, 192 Cal. App. 2d 18, 13 Cal. Rptr. 288 
(2d Dist. 1961). In Kershman, the court held that proceeds were 
separate where the community property portion in the commin-
gled funds was minimal compared to the separate property por-
tion. The court of appeal applied this rule, slightly reversed: The 
husband's contribution to the gambling winnings were minimal 
- consisting solely of luck, while the community provided 
$10,000 - a substantial amount. 
31
Modena-Kurpinsky: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
752 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:725 
4. Death of Spouse During Dissolution Proceedings 
Kinsler v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 808, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 564 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that the 
death of spouse after a final dissolution judgment does not de-
prive a trial court of jurisdiction over remaining issues in a dis-
solution proceeding. 
During the dissolution proceeding, the trial court entered 
several minute orders concerning the use and disposition of 
property and awarded temporary spousal support to the wife. A 
final judgment was entered, with the trial court reserving juris-
diction to determine separate property and distribute commu-
nity property. The husband died six days after final judgment. 
The trial court order ended the action and vacated all or-
ders regarding spousal support, possession of real estate and re-
straining orders made as of the husband's death. The trial court 
reasoned that the husband's death deprived it of jurisdiction to 
determine issues remaining undecided at final judgment based 
on its interpretation of In re Marriage of Shayman, 35 Cal. App. 
3d 648, 111 Cal. Rptr. 11 (lst Dist. 1973). In Shayman, the hus-
band died prior to final judgment but after the court made its 
findings and conclusions and entered an interlocutory judgment. 
In reviewing Shayman, the court of appeal noted that death 
of a party to a dissolution proceeding normally ends the action 
and deprives the court of jurisdiction to decide further issues. 
However, because the Shayman court had made certain findings 
prior to the husband's death, jurisdiction continued to imple-
ment orders necessary to carrying out those findings. 
The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate 
ordering the superior court to vacate its order, substitute in the 
husband's estate and determine issues over which jurisdiction 
had been reserved. 
5. Discovery of Spouse's Employment Records 
Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 82 (2d Dist. 1981). Records of corporate employees' earn-
ings were held nondiscoverable in a marital dissolution proceed-
ing. The court of appeal held that a balancing test, weighing the 
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party's need for the information against the non-party's consti-
tutional right to privacy, must be used before discovery is or-
dered. Discovery should not be compelled where records sought 
are not relevant to the issues in a marital dissolution, according 
to the court. 
In addition, the court held that in order to facilitate truth-
ful income tax returns, income tax records are also 
nondiscoverable. 
In Rifkind, the wife sought certain documents from her hus-
band during their dissolution action. He had been president of a 
corporate law firm. Financial reports of the law firm through 
1979 had been produced prior to this action; 1980 reports were 
promised. The husband was willing to produce records of his 
earnings, pensions and obligations, but objected to production of 
income tax returns from the law corporation and three partner-
ships, as well as records relating to the financial earnings of 
other shareholders. The superior court ordered production of the 
documents. The husband appealed. 
The court of appeal ordered the superior court to vacate its 
order. It held that the under the rule of Webb v. Standard Oil, 
49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957), production of income tax 
returns may not be compelled through coercion for the benefit of 
a private litigant, and that the rule applies despite the hus-
band's control over corporate tax returns as president of the 
corporation. 
The wife's request for documents concerning compensation 
and profit sharing plans of other corporate employees was de-
nied as irrelevant. 
6. Change of Venue Improperly Denied 
Silva v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 301, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 832 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a supe-
rior court abused its discretion in denying change of venue in a 
dissolution proceeding where denial was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 397 allows 
change of venue when several factors are met, among them, 
when the convenience of witnesses and justice will be served; 
and-specifically in dissolution proceedings-when the ends of 
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justice will be promoted. 
The wife petitioned for dissolution in Los Angeles, her resi-
dence. The husband moved for a change of venue to San Mateo 
County stating that he had custody of the couple's six children, 
that he worked in San Mateo, and that the home the couple 
owned was in San Mateo. He alleged a trial in Los Angeles 
would be an extreme hardship on his children and himself. 
The husband's motion was denied despite the fact it was 
unopposed by the wife. On review, the court of appeal ordered a 
change of venue to San Mateo County. 
The wife appealed, alleging that under Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 397(3) and Flanagan v. Flanagan, 175 Cal. App. 2d 
641, 346 P.2d 418 (2d Dist. 1959), a motion for change of venue 
must contain the names of witnesses inconvenienced, a state-
ment on the relevance of their testimony and an explanation of 
the alleged inconvenience. 
The court stated that Flanagan did not require affidavits 
and that other requirements of section 397 had been met. It was 
evident from his declaration that child custody was an issue. 
Since the children were likely witnesses, the inconvenience of 
traveling to Los Angeles County and missing school established 
the witnesses' inconvenience. There was no question that the 
children's testimony was relevant to the custody issue according 
to the court. 
Balancing considerations of the wife's economic situation 
against the husband's costs of moving his family to Los Angeles 
for trial, the court concluded that changing venue to San Mateo 
County supported the ends of justice. 
7. Discoverability of Spouse's Business Records 
Smith v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 136, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 145 (1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that names 
of a husband's psychiatric patients were privileged from discov-
ery in a dissolution proceeding. The wife sought disclosure of the 
names to determine the community's financial status. 
The husband, a psychiatrist, sought a writ of mandate to 
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restrain his wife from enforcing a discovery order requiring him 
to produce the names, addresses and telephone numbers of cur-
rent and former patients. The wife's request stemmed from a 
challenge of the husband's financial records produced during a 
dissolution proceeding. The husband's records consisted solely 
of income tax returns and bank deposit slips. The wife was in 
possession of the husband's appointment book and contended 
that the book evidenced a higher yearly income. 
The trial court denied the husband's motion finding no psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege in the information the husband 
was compelled to disclose and noting the insubstantial nature of 
the records already produced. 
The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of prohibition, 
restraining enforcement of the discovery order. The court noted 
that Evidence Code section 1014 gave the husband the privilege 
to refuse disclosure of confidential communications. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 
557,85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) implied that identity of an individ-
ual undergoing psychotherapy was included in the section 1014 
privilege. The court of appeal found persuasive the reasoning of 
City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 513, 168 
Cal. Rptr. 49 (1980), in which a policeman was not compelled to 
disclose psychiatric treatment. The court there ruled that a 
broad privilege should be given to psychiatrists and their pa-
tients, due to the sensitive nature of the privacy interests 
involved. 
E. HEALTH AND WELFARE 
1. Ability of Department of Health to Regulate 
Sterilizations 
California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, 124 Cal. App. 3d 28, 
177 Cal. Rptr. 188 (3d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that 
the Department of Health Services has power, under the com-
bined authority of Health and Safety Code sections 1275, 1276 
and 1294, to regulate operations such as sterilizations. Health 
and Safety Code section 1275 gives the Department the power to 
adopt, amend or repeal reasonable rules to implement hospital 
care regulation. Section 1276 regulates standards of adequacy, 
safety and sanitation. The Department may suspend or revoke a 
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license where a violation is found, under section 1294. 
The court further held that the power to regulate steriliza-
tion procedures, stemming from these sections, is consistent 
with the legislative intent of section 1258. Section 1258 prohibits 
sterilizations based upon nonmedical qualifications, except with 
informed consent. 
The California Medical Association (CMA) argued that the 
Department of Health Services was authorized only to supervise 
hospital activities within areas covered in section 1276, such as 
buildings, safety and sanitation, and that the power to regulate 
the doctor-patient relationship was not expressly given by 
statute. 
The trial court upheld the regulations affecting informed 
consent. The court of appeal affirmed. 
The court discussed the general powers sections 1276 and 
1294 which enable the Department of Health Services to adopt 
rules and suspend violators, and concluded that the section 1258 
regulations requiring informed consent, as detailed in Title 22, 
would be given weight by virtue of the Department's authority 
under these sections. 
CMA argued that the Department overstepped its jurisdic-
tion in regulating physicians' conduct; such regulation should be 
left to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance. However, the 
court found no conBict between the two departments, since any 
violation of Title 22 is to be reported only to the Medical Board 
and the Department of Health Services will not take indepen-
dent disciplinary action. 
Further, the court rejected CMA's suggestion that informed 
consent rules were unnecessary because of the availability of tort 
actions. The court stressed there is nothing wrong with the De-
partment seeking to prevent a wrong from occuring in the first 
place. 
2. Unconstitutionality of Restriction on Medi-Cal Abor-
tion Funding 
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 
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3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). The California 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional provisions of the Budget 
Acts. The court found that a restriction on a medical service was 
inconsistent with Medi-Cal's stated purpose of providing medi-
cal service to the needy, that funding restrictions impaired a wo-
man's right to procreative choice by effectively limiting access to 
abortions, and that funding cutbacks were not the least restric-
tive means of furthering any state interest in childbirth. For an 
extensive review of this case, see Note, Committee to Defend 
Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Procreative Choice Guaranteed 
for All Women, supra, page 691. 
3. DES Mother's Disclosure of Personal Medical History 
in Daughter's Suit 
Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 148 (lst Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a dieth-
ylstilbestrol (DES) mother could not refuse to disclose her medi-
cal history in a suit by her daughter against DES manufacturers. 
The mother's partial disclosure of a significant portion of her 
personal medical history operated to waive the physician-patient 
privilege of Evidence Code section 994. 
In a companion case, the court held that a DES daughter 
was compelled to seek information from her mother to com-
pletely answer interrogatories. The mother-daughter spirit of co-
operation existing in the suit justified the order. 
Two women brought suit against pharmaceutical companies 
for breach of warranties, strict product liability, negligence and 
enterprise liability under Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 
3d 558, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). Their mothers 
had taken DES manufactured by the companies prior to the 
births of the plaintiffs. The two cases were consolidated. 
The pharmaceutical company moved to compel one mother 
to disclose her medical history both prior and subsequent to the 
birth of her daughter. The mother responded by agreeing to dis-
close names of the medical staff who had treated her prior to her 
daughter's birth, but refusing to disclose any additional informa-
tion under the physician-patient privilege. 
The trial court ordered her to respond to questions pertain-
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ing to the time period prior to the birth, and her medical history 
subsequent to the birth. The court of appeal affirmed. 
Under Evidence Code section 994, a patient has a privilege 
to refuse disclosure of confidential communications with a doc-
tor. However, this privilege is waived when the patient discloses 
a significant part of the communications, under Evidence Code 
section 912. The mother's revelation of a significant portion of 
her medical history in offering names of physicians and hospitals 
acted as a waiver. 
The court also concluded the mother's constitutional right 
to privacy regarding disclosure of medical information was not 
absolute but must be balanced against compelling state inter-
ests, such as a defendant's right to discover relevant informa-
tion. The court of appeal concluded that the order compelling 
answers did not force the mother to answer all questions con-
cerning her medical history, but only the few requested. 
In the companion case, Benny v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 
App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (lst Dist. 1981), the court cited 
Chodos v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 2d 318, 30 Cal. Rptr. 
303 (2d Dist. 1963), which stated that a party without knowledge 
can be compelled to investigate facts when sources of informa-
tion are apparently available. Since it appeared from the record 
the mother was supporting her daughter'S suit, the trial court's 
order compelling the daughter to ask her mother for information 
necessary to answer interrogatories was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
F. PENSIONS AND DISABILITY BENEFITS 
1. Lawyer's Failure to Include Pension As CQmmunity 
Asset 
Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257 
(1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal refused to hold a lawyer 
liable for failure to include a military pension as a community 
asset in a dissolution proceeding because the law concerning mil-
itary pensions changed after the proceeding. The court held fail-
ure of the lawyer to anticipate reversal of the law was not 
malpractice. 
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In 1970, the lawyer represented the wife in a dissolution 
proceeding. Although the husband had a vested interest in a 
military pension, the lawyer advised the wife that the pension 
was not community property. The pension was not included in 
the settlement. . 
In 1974, the California Supreme Court determined in In re 
Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 
369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), that a vested retirement 
benefit, such as the husband's military pension, was subject to 
community division upon dissolution. Subsequently, the wife 
brought an action charging her lawyer with malpractice for fail-
ing to advise her that the community pension area was 
unsettled. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the lawyer. 
The wife's appeal was denied. The concept of community inter-
est in vested pensions had shifted dramatically in a short period 
of time. The court found the lawyer's advice was based upon a 
thorough knowledge of case law at the time of the dissolution 
proceeding. The court rejected the wife's contention that the 
lawyer should have given her the option of claiming the pension 
as part of the community's assets and pursuing the matter on 
appeal. 
The court of appeal concluded that an attorney's duty does 
not extend to advising clients on all conceivable alternatives of 
action regardless offutility. 
2. Distribution of Pension After Dissolution Judgment 
Giovannoni v. Giovannoni, 122 Cal. App. 3d 666, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. 154 (1st Dist. 1981). Where the distribution of a pension 
as a community asset in a dissolution proceeding has not been 
adjudicated or approved by the court, the court of appeal held 
that a later action for distribution is not barred by res judicata. 
The couple stipulated to distribution of community prop-
erty. This agreement was approved by the court as fair and equi-
table. A pension the husband was to receive from his employer 
was mentioned in the stipulation, but, as understood by both 
parties, the pension had no value since there was no vested in-
terest at the time of the dissolution proceeding. The wife's attor-
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ney advised her that neither she nor her husband had an inter-
est in the pension. 
Three years after the decision, the husband retired and be-
gan receiving his pension. It was discovered that the pension had 
been fully vested at the time of dissolution. Based on In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 
(1976), the husband's pension was community property and sub-
ject to division. The wife filed suit seeking her community inter-
est in the pension. 
The wife contended that under Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 
323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980), res judicata did not 
bar her suit for distribution. In Henn, a court had issued an in-
terlocutory and final decree without mention of a vested pen-
sion. The Supreme Court of California held that res judicata did 
not apply since the issue of the pension had not been before the 
court. However, the trial court rejected this argument and dis-
missed her suit. 
The. court of appeal reversed and remanded on a finding 
that there had been no adjudication of the parties' rights to the 
husband's pension. The husband attempted to distinguish Henn, 
arguing that the pension was before the court because it was 
mentioned in the stipulation agreement; whereas in Henn, there 
was no mention of the asset. The court rejected this distinction, 
citing the decision in Miller v. Miller, 117 Cal. App. 3d 366, 172 
Cal. Rptr. 745 (4th dist. 1981). In Miller, a similar argument was 
rejected where a military pension was mentioned in a stipulation 
agreement, but was not litigated as an issue in the distribution 
process. In this situation, the pension was withdrawn from the 
court's consideration because the parties believed it had no 
value and was not litigated in the dissolution proceeding. The 
court found Henn controlling, and the wife was therefore free to 
pursue her share of the pension, not being barred by res 
judicata. 
3. Applicability of McCarty 
In re Marriage of Jacanin, 124 Cal. App. 3d 67, 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 186 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that Califor-
nia's community property laws governing distribution of a mili-
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tary pension in a dissolution proceeding are preempted by fed-
erallegislation under application of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
An interlocutory dissolution judgment gave the wife a share 
of her husband's Navy retirement pension in addition to custody 
and spousal support provisions. 
On appeal, the court disallowed the wife's community in-
terest share in her husband's pension. Despite Congress' failure 
to expressly state its intention that federal laws preempt state 
community property laws governing military pensions, McCarty 
was interpreted by the court as warranting preemption of state 
policy concerning division of military pensions upon dissolution. 
4. Right to Pension Benefits Resulting From Redeposit 0/ 
Funds 
In re Marriage 0/ Lucero, 118 Cal. App. 3d 836, 173 Cal. 
Rptr. 680 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a wife's 
community interest in her husband's pension extended to the 
full amount of benefits after redeposit of employee contribu-
tions. The court reasoned that since the wife was willing to pay a 
pro-rata share of her husband's separate property redeposit, she 
was entitled to share in the resulting increased benefits. 
The couple married in 1947 and divorced in 1955. They co-
habited until their remarriage in 1956, finally separating in 1976. 
The husband worked for the Federal government periodically 
during the marriage and accumulated thirty years and one 
month of credit towards his employee contribution fund pen-
sion. He withdrew $9,373 from this fund in 1966. To receive the 
maximum benefit upon retirement he redeposited that amount 
after separation, using his separate funds. 
The trial court determined that: (1) neither party was enti-
tled to spousal support; (2) the community interest in the hus-
band's benefit equalled the ratio of time of employment during 
the second marriage to total time of employment, or 68 percent; 
(3) the community's 68 percent interest extended only to bene-
fits the husband would have received absent redeposit of the 
amount withdrawn from the fund; (4) the community's interest 
in the wife's retirement benefit would be determined using the 
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same formula employed to calculate the community's interest in 
the husband's fund; and (5) jurisdiction was reserved over distri-
bution of the wife's pension once it fell due. 
The court of appeal modified the judgment, allowing the 
wife to elect to participate in the husband's increased retirement 
benefits upon paying a pro-rata share of the redeposit. In addi-
tion, the husband was required to pay the wife her share of pay-
ments which were received by him before trial, with future pay-
ments disbursed directly to the wife. The judgment also 
adjusted the amount of the wife's employment time attributable 
to the community's vested interest in her retirement pension. 
The trial court's decision to deny the wife's participation in 
the husband's increased benefits was viewed by the court of ap-
peal as giving the husband sole control over whether to redeposit 
and what funds to use, in effect, treating the pension as the hus-
band's separate property. 
In In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), the California Supreme Court deter-
mined that the community owns all pension rights attributable 
to employment during marriage. Therefore, under Brown, the 
trial court was incorrect because the spouses had equal rights 
both in determining whether to redeposit, as well as in sharing 
in the increased benefits. 
The court of appeal also considered In re Marriage of Sten-
quist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978), in 
determining the community's interest in the redeposit of funds. 
In Stenquist, the California Supreme Court held that because 
the spousal duty of fair dealing did not end with dissolution, a 
spouse could not destroy a community interest by invoking a 
condition solely within his or her control. Therefore, the hus-
band could not preclude his wife's participation in the increased 
benefits through an independent decision to use separate funds 
to redeposit. 
The wife contended the trial court erred in failing to recog-
nize a community interest in pension rights acquired during the 
couple's first marriage. The court of appeal noted. that Brown 
was not fully retroactive and did not apply to the first marriage. 
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The court of appeal also noted the wife's argument that the 
period of cohabitation with her husband entitled her to an addi-
tional share in the pension benefits could only be heard in a civil 
contracts action under the ruling of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 
3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). 
5. McCarty Not Applicable to Pension Stipulation 
In re Marriage of Mahone, 123 Cal. App. 3d 17, 176 Cal. 
Rptr. 274 (2d Dist. 1981). Despite the United States Supreme 
Court's ruling that community property laws concerning distri-
bution of military pensions are preempted by federal law, the 
court of appeal held that a military pension may be treated as a 
community interest where parties to a dissolution have so stipu-
lated before the change in law. The parties married while the 
husband was in the Air Force. Although he left the military five 
years after their marriage, he qualified for a military pension. 
(The record does not specify his total years of service.) At the 
time of this action, he was receiving $1,811 a month from the 
pension. 
Under In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 
449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825, reh'g denied, 
419 U.S. 1060 (1974) the husband's military pension was a com-
munity asset at the time of dissolution. He argued that under 
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) his military pension 
was exempt from distribution. The court rejected this argument 
and bound the husband to his stipulation at the time of dissolu-
tion, three years before McCarty. The military pension was gov-
erned by the law as of the date of the stipulation, therefore, the 
military pension was a community holding. 
In his dissent, Appellate Court Judge Stephens stressed 
that, because a military pension is not community property ac-
cording to McCarty. the parties were not bound to their previ-
ous stipulation. 
6. Retroactivity of McCarty 
In re Marriage of Sheldon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 371, 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 380 (4th Dist.), modified, 125 Cal. App. 3d 415f (1981). 
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District also limited the ret-
roactivity of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mc-
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Carty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). McCarty held that fed-
eral law preempted community property law governing 
distribution of military pensions. The court determined that 
McCarty will control: where a case is not final on appeal, only 
after the military spouse has raised the issue on appeal, or where 
the court was initially requested to reserve jurisdiction over the 
military pension. 
In its interlocutory decree of dissolution, the court awarded 
the residence to the wife, and the husband's military pension to 
the husband. The difference in value was waived by the wife. 
The husband appealed, arguing he should have received a one-
half interest in the combined value of the assets and did not 
contest the designation of the military pension as a community 
asset. 
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's award, in an 
unpublished opinion filed June 8, 1981. On June 26, 1981, the 
McCarty decision was announced. Subsequently, the husband 
petitioned for rehearing, arguing that McCarty should be ap-
plied retroactively. The court of appeal affirmed the dissolution 
award, denying McCarty's application to the husband's case. 
Chevron Oil Company v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) estab-
lished three factors to be used in settling retroactivity issues: (1) 
whether the decision to be applied established a new principle, 
or was an issue of first impression; (2) whether the purpose of 
the decision mandates retroactive application; and (3) whether 
retroactive application will result in hardship or injustice. 
In analyzing McCarty, the court noted that the issue in Mc-
Carty was essentially one of first impression. Chevron presented 
a similar situation. There, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that its decision should not be retroactive because it over-
ruled previous decisions. The McCarty decision represented a 
dramatic reversal of a long line of California cases holding that 
military pensions are community property. Therefore, under the 
first Chevron factor, McCarty would not be retroactive. 
The stated purpose of Congress in preempting community 
property laws governing military pensions were twofold accord-
ing to McCarty: (1) to provide for retired military personnel and 
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(2) that military pensions serve as inducements for enlistment or 
reenlistment. In discussing the second factor of the retroactivity 
test (whether the purpose of the decision mandates retroactive 
application) the court noted that neither congressional purpose 
would be furthered by full retroactivity of McCarty. Only a 
small number of military spouses, those divorced but not yet re-
tired, would benefit from an extension of McCarty. Similarly, 
retroactivity would not induce further enlistments, according to 
the court. Therefore, non-retroactive application would result in 
minimal harm to both stated federal purposes. 
Concerning the third factor, (whether a retroactive applica-
tion would result in hardship or injustice) the court emphasized 
the potential harm that would result if parties were free to reliti-
gate on the basis of McCarty. For example, a spouse might not 
be able to repay the military spouse for benefits received or all 
plans made in expectation of pension benefits would be de-
stroyed. The court stressed the need for finality in marital disso-
lution proceedings. 
Although the husband argued McCarty should be applied in 
his case since his appeal was filed prior to the United States Su-
preme Court's decision, the court of appeal noted that issues not 
raised in opening briefs are waived. The husband failed to in-
clude a federal preemption issue during the trial and in the 
briefs for petition of rehearing. 
7. Constitutionality of Remarriage Clause in Pension 
Legislation 
McCourtney v. Cory, 123 Cal. App. 3d 431, 176 Cal. Rptr. 
639 (2d Dist. 1981). California Government Code section 75070, 
which gives the surviving spouse of a judge, eligible under the 
Judges' Retirement Law, an allowance until death or remarriage, 
was found constitutional by the court of appeal. Although other 
Government Code sections provide allowances for surviving 
spouses despite remarriage, the remarriage clause of section 
75070 endured equal protection and due process scrutiny. The 
court also found section 75070 does not interfere with the right 
to marry. 
The wives of several deceased judges had challenged the 
constitutionality of Government Code section 75070. Under the 
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section, they received one-half of their deceased husband's for-
mer pay but the allowance was terminable on death or remar-
riage. The section was challenged on equal protection and due 
process grounds because other classes of surviving government 
spouses received allowances· despite remarriage. In addition, the 
wives argued the section had a chilling effect on their exercise of 
the constitutional right to marry. 
The trial court issued a declaratory judgment ordering the 
Controller of the State of California to pay the wives allowances 
until their death. The court of appeal reversed. 
The court found that termination of the allowance upon re-
marriage did not interfere with the wives' right to marry because 
there was no direct barrier to marriage. Califano v. Jobst, 434 
U.S. 47 (1977), was found directly on point. In Califano, a Social 
Security Act provision giving benefits to children of deceased 
wage earners made it more desirable for a child to marry a fel-
low beneficiary. A child's benefits terminated at marriage unless 
marriage was to another beneficiary. The Supreme Court found 
this statute constitutional. While its effect was to make some in-
dividuals preferrable over others, it was not an attempt to inter-
fere with the decision to marry. The effect of section 75070 was 
similar with regard to the wives' decision to marry; this statute 
did not directly or substantially interfere with their decision. 
The wives' second challenge was based on equal protection 
grounds. Government Code section 75093, another provision of 
the Judges' Retirement Law, applying to spouses of judges who 
died in office, gave an allowance without the remarriage limita-
tion. Similarly, section 75033.5 provided a retirement plan for 
judges which would give their surviving spouses an allowance for 
life. The court of appeal noted, however, that since the funda-
mental right to marry was not involved, the section only had to 
meet rational basis scrutiny under Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
348 U.S. 483 (1955). The court found the difference in remar-
riage limitations between sections 75070 and 75093 could have 
been based on the legislature'S perception of differing needs of 
surviving spouses. This was found to be a reasonable basis for 
distinction between the two classes. 
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8. Suit For Distribution of Military Pension Not Barred 
Miller v. Miller, 117 Cal. App. 3d 366, 172 Cal. Rptr. 745 
(4th Dist. 1981). Where distribution of a community property 
military pension has not been adjudicated, the court of appeal 
held that a subsequent suit for partition is not precluded by res 
judicata. 
The husband retired after seventeen years of military ser-
vice and began receiving his vested pension. When the couple 
separated, they entered into a property agreement which men-
tioned but did not distribute the pension. This agreement was 
incorporated into the interlocutory dissolution judgment. The is-
sue of whether the pension was distributable as community 
property was not raised at trial. 
The wife filed an action seeking partition of the pension in 
accordance with community property laws. The trial court's de-
cision was controlled by Kelley v. Kelley, 73 Cal. App. 3d 672, 
141 Cal. Rptr. 33 (4th Dist. 1977), and a nonsuit was granted. 
The court barred the wife's suit because the parties knew the 
pension was community property at the time of the dissolution 
proceeding and could have raised the issue at that trial. 
The court of appeal overruled the trial court finding, noting 
that the decision of Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 
161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980) was not available at the time of the 
trial. Henn overruled the Kelley application of res judicata. Ac-
cording to Henn, future litigation of community property inter-
ests is not precluded unless the issues were subjected to the 
court's adjudication, or an agreement between the parties as to 
distribution was made. 
Although the parties had mentioned the pension in their 
stipulation agreement, the court found this was not equivalent 
to litigation on the issue of distribution and thus was not subject 
to a res judicata bar. 
9. Exemption of Pension From Writ of Execution 
Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 117 Cal. App. 3d 397, 172 Cal. Rptr. 
641 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that where spousal 
support had not been ordered, a pension was exempt from exe-
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cution under Code of Civil Procedure section 690.18. The court 
found that exemption statutes are to be construed liberally, and 
exceptions to the statutes are to be read narrowly. 
Prior to dissolution, the husband and wife had agreed on 
spousal support. The parties obtained an interlocutory judgment 
in which the agreement was approved, but not merged with the 
final judgment. The final judgment contained no express provi-
sions regarding spousal payments. 
The wife brought an action for breach of contract and for an 
accounting of support due under the agreement. She won a 
money judgment from the trial court and obtained a writ of exe-
cution which was levied upon her husband's civil service pen-
sion. The husband appealed the denial of this claim for an ex-
emption from the writ under Code of Civil Procedure section 
690.18. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court of 
appeal determined that the principal objective of the exemption 
statutes was to provide support and welfare for the debtor's 
benefit. 
The court found no exception to the exemption statute ap-
plicable where, as here, a judgment for payment of spousal sup-
port was not subject to modification by the court. The wife's 
judgment was based upon a settlement agreement not subject to 
modifications; the dissolution judgment itself did not provide for 
spousal payments. 
G. INHERITANCE DETERMINATIONS 
1. Claim To Estate Based Upon Premarriage Cohabita-
tion Agreement 
Estate of Fincher, 119 Cal. App. 3d 343, 174 Cal. Rptr. 18 
(2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal upheld a probate court's 
jurisdiction over a Marvin agreement along with a Probate Code 
claim. The court also determined the statute of limitations on a 
Marvin agreement accrues once the relationship on which the 
contract is based has ended. 
Prior to marriage, decedent had lived with plaintiff periodi-
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cally for seven years. This relationship was interrupted but later 
renewed. They eventually married. 
Decedent intentionally omitted his wife from his will, leav-
ing her insurance benefits instead. The wife claimed a portion of 
the estate, alleging that decedent's will had been fraudulently 
obtained and that her combined status as surviving spouse and 
Marvin partner entitled her to one-half decedent's estate. 
A jury found the will had not been fraudulently induced 
and that seven years of the couple's cohabitation was based on 
an implied Marvin agreement. One year of cohabitation, be-
tween renewal of their relationship and marriage, was also deter-
mined to have been grounded on a Marvin relationship. 
At a special hearing, the probate court found that the two 
year statute of limitations on the implied Marvin agreement ac-
crued once the parties' first relationship ended, barring enforce-
ment of the implied contract. The court also found the wife had 
a community property interest in decedent's estate, commencing 
at marriage, and a partnership interest, equivalent to a commu-
nity interest, from renewal of the couple's relationship until 
marriage. The wife's appeal of the trial court's bar of her im-
plied Marvin agreement was denied. 
The court of appeal noted that the wife's 'claim under Pro-
bate Code section 1080 would be incorrect if her only basis was a 
Marvin-type relationship. As surviving spouse, however, the wife 
was an heir under section 1080 and could rightfully assert a 
claim to community property. 
In Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal. 2d 192,417 P.2d 683, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 139 (1966), the California Supreme Court determined that 
a probate court having jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim 
could hear any ancillary matter such as the wife's Marvin claim. 
The wife argued that under Code of Civil Procedure section 
339, subdivision (1), her claim accrued at decedent's death. The 
court disagreed, noting that the end of the couple's seven year 
relationship effectively triggered commencement of any action 
the wife had to the community property. 
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2. Revocation of Prenuptial Will 
Estate of Green, 120 Cal. App. 3d 589, 174 Cal. Rptr. 654 
(1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a will made prior 
to marriage was revoked as to a surviving spouse, where it either 
failed to provide for a future spouse, or failed to specifically dis-
inherit a future spouse or heir. 
Decedent made his will prior to marriage, naming his sister 
as primary beneficiary. Mter marriage, he failed to change his 
will, and died four months later. 
The surviving spouse petitioned to determine her entitle-
ment to the estate under Probate Code section 70. Section 70 
would revoke decedent's will where the surviving spouse could 
show: (1) it was made prior to marriage; (2) the surviving spouse 
was not provided for in a marriage contract; (3) decedent's will 
did not provide for the surviving spouse; or (4) the surviving 
spouse was mentioned in a way showing intent not to provide for 
her. 
The trial court revoked the will under section 70. Dece-
dent's sister's motions for reconsideration and a new trial were 
denied. 
In affirming, the court of appeal noted that section 70 repre-
sents a policy to resist disinheriting a surviving spouse where a 
will made prior to marriage contains no provision for the survi-
vor. The court of appeal noted that decedent's will failed to 
clearly manifest an intent to disinherit an after-married surviv-
ing spouse, as it must in order to forestall application of section 
70. 
3. Support Allowance From Estate After Estrangement 
Estate of Kalal, 121 Cal. App. 3d 841, 175 Cal. Rptr. 582 
(lst Dist. 1981). A surviving spouse's right to an allowance dur-
ing settlement of the deceased spouse's estate, as provided in 
Probate Code section 680, is not absolute, according to the court 
of appeal. The section 680 allowance is conditioned upon the 
survivor's right to support at the time of the spouse's death. 
The court found that a family allowance petition, based on 
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a stipulation agreement by parties to a dissolution, was incor-
rectly denied berause the stipulation did not conform with the 
requirements of Civil Code section 5131. Under section 5131, an 
agreement to live apart without mutual support is grounds to 
deny an allowance. 
The court also held that facts indicating spouses are living 
apart independently does not constitute waiver of the support 
right. However, while a spouse's financial condition cannot be 
used to deny a family allowance, it can be a factor in determin-
ing necessity. 
Upon initiating dissolution proceedings, the wife petitioned 
to force her husband to vacate their home. The parties stipu-
lated to certain issues, not pertinent here, and agreed that the 
restraining order and order to vacate would operate temporarily. 
The agreement did not address spousal support. The wife died 
prior to final determination of the dissolution proceeding. 
Following the temporary order but prior to the wife's death, 
the couple lived apart, did not support each other, and were not 
in contact with each other. When the wife died, the husband re-
turned home and petitioned for a family allowance which the 
probate court summarily denied. He appealed, contending the 
court abused its discretion. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded to consider the 
husband's financial circumstances in determining whether an al-
lowance was necessary. 
The court cited Estate of Fawcett, 232 Cal. App. 2d 770, 43 
Cal. Rptr. 160 (1st Dist. 1965) as establishing that a family al-
lowance is conditioned upon the surviving spouse's right to sup-
port at the time of decedent's death. Fawcett was also important 
in determining whether the husband was properly denied an al-
lowance under Civil Code section 5131. Civil Code section 5131 
states that one spouse need not support the other when the 
couple is living apart by agreement, unless support is stipulated 
in the agreement. In Fawcett, an order of temporary support ex-
piring prior to the husband's death was not equivalent to an 
agreement to live apart, triggering the 5131 exemption. 
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In Fawcett, initiation of dissolution proceedings did not op-
erate as an agreement to live apart. Here, the couple signed a 
stipulation agreement, had not separated prior to the show cause 
hearing and the order to vacate was only temporary. 
4. Stepped-up Tax Basis of Surviving Spouse 
Mel v. Franchise Tax Board, 119 Cal. App. 3d 898, 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 269 (1st Dist. 1981), hearing denied, Sept. 16, 1981. The 
court of appeal held that Revenue and Tax Code section 
18045(e), in its 1966-1975 version, allowed for an acquired prop-
erty stepped-up tax basis only where a surviving spouse could 
show decedent's gross estate was subject to inheritance taxation. 
With the stepped-up tax basis a taxpayer can use the market 
value of community assets, as of deceased's death, in computing 
personal income tax. 
After decedent died, all community property was admitted 
to probate, including the surviving spouse's one-half share. The 
inheritance tax appraiser, valued the community property at over 
five million dollars and assessed inheritance taxes. Following her 
husband's death and will administration, the wife sold portions 
of her community property share. In calculating personal income 
tax, she used the market value of the assets as of her husband's 
death as a tax basis. 
The Franchise Tax Board disapproved the stepped-up tax 
basis and assessed additional income. The wife protested, but 
died before the hearing. Her executors brought this action. 
The controversy centered on interpretation of Revenue and 
Tax Code section 18045(e), which allows a section 18044 tax 
base, "if at least one-half of the whole of the community interest 
in such property was includable in determining the value of the 
Decedent's gross estate under chapter 3 of the California Inheri-
tance Tax Law." The trial court determined the stepped-up tax 
basis was proper under section 18045(e) since one-half of the to-
tal community interest had been included in decedent's gross 
estate. 
On appeal, the Franchise Tax Board contended that section 
18045(e), in light of federal income statutes, indicated that use 
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of the stepped-up tax basis was improper. The court of appeal 
reversed the trial court's ruling. 
Both parties agreed section 18045(e) was intended to bring 
California into conformity with federal income tax law. Under 
federal law, a taxpayer is not entitled to a stepped-up tax basis 
unless at least one-half of the community property was subject 
to federal estate taxation under Collins v. United States, 318 F. 
Supp. 382 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 787 (9th 
Cir. 1971). To insure uniformity, stepped-up basis cannot be 
used unless decedent's gross estate was subject to inheritance 
tax. 
H. PATERNITY ACTIONS 
1. Cannot Compel Answers to Interrogatories Where Re-
sponse Would Incriminate 
Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 178 Cal. 
Rptr. 358 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that puta-
tive fathers may be required to answer interrogatories in a pa-
ternity action, subject to immunity from use of the answers in a 
criminal prosecution. 
The Orange County district attorney brought suit on behalf 
of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), to establish paternity and obtain support orders. Suit 
was authorized under Welfare and Institutions Code section 
11350, which allows the county to sue for recovery of payments 
made under the provisions of AFDC, where a parent is found to 
be either gainfully employed or reasonably able to assist in sup-
port of the recipient. 
The interrogatories in question required that the alleged fa-
thers give information regarding their financial status and sexual 
relations with the mothers. The trial court ruled that answers 
could be used in actions under Penal Code section 270. Section 
270 provides that a father of a minor child who willfully fails to 
provide remedial care for his child is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
The district attorney moved to compel answers under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 2034, which provides sanctions for re-
fusal to answer interrogatories. 
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A claim of privilege against self-incrimination may be raised 
under the fifth amendment by the fathers in any civil or crimi-
nal proceedings, including discovery, under Kastigar u. United 
States, 406 U.S. 44 (1972); Zonuer u. Superior Court, 270 Cal. 
App. 2d 613, 76 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. 1969). Further, Evidence 
Code section 940 provides a privilege against disclosure of any 
matter that may tend to incriminate. 
Issuance of a protective order granting the fathers immunity 
from use of compelled answers in a criminal proceeding arises 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 2019, and was confirmed 
in People u. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 3d 996, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
597 (2d Dist. 1975). 
I. MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Cohabitatant's Agreement Based Upon Sexual 
Relationship 
Jones u. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (2d 
Dist. 1981). An action to recover one-half of decedent's estate 
based on a cohabitation agreement was dismissed without leave 
to amend by the court of appeal. The court held the agreement 
could not form the basis of a claim on decedent's estate because 
it contained express terms indicating that sexual services were 
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and 
was therefore illegal. 
Two males lived together, holding themselves out as mar-
ried, for two years prior to decedent's death. According to peti-
tioner's complaint, he quit work to live with decedent, providing 
him with services as a lover, companion, homemaker and cook. 
Petitioner and decedent had orally agreed that earnings and 
property accumulated during their time together would be 
shared equally. During their cohabitation, the couple accumu-
lated assets worth two million dollars. 
After decedent's death, petitioner filed a creditor's claim in 
probate for one-half the estate. The executors denied peti-
tioner's claim under Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 
106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), arguing that the agreement was 
unenforceable because the complaint alleged that petitioner's 
sexual services were an express and inseparable part of the 
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agreement. 
The trial court sustained the executor's demurrer without 
leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. 
Under Marvin, cohabiting adults may contract regarding 
distribution of their earnings and property rights, provided that 
sex is not the sole or express consideration. Any portion of the 
contract that is severable from the sexual consideration is 
enforceable. 
The court of appeal noted that petitioner's complaint con-
tained on its face language indicating that the contract could not 
be considered apart from the sexual acts involved in the rela-
tionship and that petitioner's role as lover was of primary 
importance. 
2. Award For Economic Rehabilitation Rejected 
Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 
(2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held an award for economic 
rehabilitation was incorrect where not framed as an issue in the 
pleadings. Furthermore, although such an award is available 
where necessary to protect the parties' expectations, no evidence 
was presented to support the award on either legal or equitable 
grounds. 
Lee and Michelle Marvin cohabited for five years; the rela-
tionship ending at his insistence. In the landmark decision, Mar-
vin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 
(1976), the California Supreme Court held that an equitable 
remedy could be shaped to protect the parties' legitimate expec-
tations, and remanded. The trial court determined there was 
never any agreement to combine income or share property 
equally. In addition, Lee had never agreed to support Michelle 
beyond their relationship, and the couple never decided she 
should forego her career to care for him. The trial court found 
that Michelle had not been damaged as a result of her relation-
ship and had in fact benefitted, economically and socially. 
Despite finding no support obligation and no unjust emichment, 
the trial court ordered payment of $104,000 in economic 
rehabilitation. 
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The award represented the court's belief that, equitably, the 
woman was entitled to assistance allowing her to resume her ca-
reer. The award was calculated by taking her highest previous 
weekly salary as a singer, and multiplying this amount to cover a 
two year period - the time estimated for rehabilitation. On re-
view, the appellate court found the pleadings only asked for 
monthly support and maintenance; there was no request for the 
support awarded. Because the award was not within the issues 
framed by the pleadings, the court determined that the trial 
court's special findings were to be disregarded. The award was 
found to be without factual basis and was deleted. 
The court of appeal noted that under Rosenburg v. Law-
rence, 10 Cal. 2d 590, 75 P.2d 1082 (1938), a substantive right 
cannot be created in equity without some underlying obligation. 
The court concluded an award was not warranted absent a show-
ing of expectation or obligation. Since the trial court found 
neither factor, the award was withdrawn. 
J. LEGISLATION 
1. Marriage and Dissolution 
A.B. 233 - Deddeh 
Chapter 326 
Statutes of 1981 
Innocent Spouse Protected From Tax Liability. This legislation 
operates to protect an innocent spouse where the tax return of a 
couple contains either an omission or incorrect deduction attrib-
utable to one spouse. Under this amended version of Revenue 
and Taxation Code section 18402.9, if a spouse can establish 
that he or she had no knowledge of a mistake from which the 
other spouse will benefit, the innocent spouse is not liable for 
back taxes, penalties or interest. The issue of knowledge de-
pends upon the question of whether the innocent spouse had 
reason to know of the other spouse's mistake. Only those tax 
years which are not subject to res judicata and the statute of 
limitations are affected by this legislation. 
A.B. 1580 - Herger 
Chapter 327 
Statutes of 1981 
Gifts to Commissioner of Civil Marriages. Under Penal Code 
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section 70.5, it is a misdemeanor for a commissioner of civil mar-
riages to accept money or gifts for performing a marriage, other 
than the amount set as a fee. This law amends the section to 
allow a commissioner to accept money on weekends and 
holidays. 
S.B. 1199 - Marks 
Chapter 715 
Statutes of 1981 
Changes in Family Law Act. Civil Code section 4370 was 
amended to allow a court to order any party to a dissolution 
proceeding, except a governmental entity, to pay the costs of the 
suit and attorney fees. Further, the new language indicates that 
the court may award a sum, subject to modification, even after 
appeal is final. 
Civil Code section 4800.6, which had required an attorney to 
give notice to the parties that both spouses would be responsible 
to creditors despite the court's distribution of a claim to one 
spouse, was repealed and replaced with legislation incorporating 
the same notice into the interlocutory decree of dissolution, or 
the final judgment of separation. 
An amended version of section 4811 of the Civil Code added 
subdivision (d). Section (d) applies to agreements in which par-
ties provide for child and spousal support, but fails to indicate 
specific amounts for each. The total support amount will not be 
categorized by the courts, but will be known as 'family support.' 
2. Child Custody 
A.B. 344 - Thruman 
Chapter 810 
Statutes of 1981 
Investigation Required to Terminate Parental Rights. A juve-
nile probation officer is required to investigate the home life of a 
minor involved in a Civil Code section 232 parental termination 
suit. The amended version of section 232 requires that the of-
ficer's report contain: (1) a statement explaining the action; (2) a . 
statement addressing the minor's feelings about the action; (3) a 
report on the minor's relationship with the parents; (4) a state-
ment that the minor has been informed of his or her right to 
attend the termination hearing; and (5) based on the minor's 
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age, any exception to these requirements. 
The amendment to section 234 lowers the age at which a 
minor is forced to appear before the court in a parental termina-
tion proceeding. This section reduces the age from twelve to ten. 
In addition, an amendment to Civil Code section 237.5 gives 
the court authority to appoint counsel for both parents and chil-
dren, regardless of their ability to pay. However, a court cannot 
appoint the same counsel for both parties. 
3. Child Support 
A.B. 84 - McAlister 
Chapter 528 
Statutes of 1981 
Limitation on Pension Exemption. This section further limits 
the pensions exceptions from the execution of child support or-
ders. The legislature substituted the phrase "judgment or order 
for" in place of "court ordered" in section 690.18 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, section 22005 of the Education Code and Gov-
ernment Code section 21201, thus providing procedure through 
which support orders are more readily enforced. 
4. Spousal Support 
S.B. 1019 - Greene 
Chapter 927 
Statutes of 1981 
Consideration of Medical Insurance in Support Award. Section 
4706 was added to the Civil Code to allow a judge to consider 
medical insurance coverage in an action for spousal support. 
Section 1149, added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, allows 
for medical insurance information where child support is or-
dered. Under these sections, the supporting party must fill out a 
state medical insurance form at a judge's request. 
A.B. 2135 - Konnyu 
Chapter 514 
Statutes of 1981 
Factors in Awarding Spousal Support. Civil Code section 4801 
was amended to require court consideration of several factors in 
determining the amount of spousal support to be awarded in a 
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dissolution proceeding. Among the new factors are: the amount 
of time the supported spouse will need to be trained or educated 
in order to be' employed; the age of the parties; and the parties 
accustomed standard of living. Upon motion and a showing of 
good cause, the court may also order a spouse to undergo exami-
nation by a vocational training consultant (VTC). A VTC is an 
individual trained with a specialized knowledge in the area of 
career formulation and planning. 
5. Pregnancy 
A.B. 267 - McAlister 
Statutes of 1981 
Regulation of Wrongful Life Cause of Action. In response to 
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2d Diet. 1980), where a genetically damaged 
child's cause of action for wrongful life was created, the legisla-
ture added section 43.6 to the Civil Code. Section 43.6 prohibits 
a suit by a child against hie or her parents on the grounds that 
conception should not have taken place or that the child should 
not have been born. Also, under this section a third party may 
not assert as a defense or reason to reduce any damage award 
that a child should have been aborted by his or her parents. 
6. Paternity 
A.B. 123 - Stirling 
Chapter 266 
Statutes of 1981 
Admissibility of HLA Blood Tests. This bill amends section 895 
of the Evidence Code. Human leococyte antigen (HLA) tests will 
be used to prove paternity if experts disagree over the question 
of paternity, or if blood tests show a probability that the male is 
the father. The issue will then be submitted to the court, includ-
ing evidence based on HLA tests. Previously, this section al-
lowed for submission upon all the evidence only, excluding the 
results of the HLA test. 
A.B. 207 - Stirling 
Chapter 1180 
Statutes of 1981 
Use of Blood Tests to Rebut Paternity Presumption. Evidence 
Code section 621 conclusively presumes a child bom while hus-
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band and wife are cohabitating to be the husband's where the 
husband is not sterile or impotent. This section was amended to 
allow the mother to rebut this presumption by moving for blood 
tests within two years of the child's birth if the child's biological 
father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity. 
III. TORT LAW 
A. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
1. Recovery For Death of Fetus 
Johnson v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 63 (2d Dist. 1981). A mother who had sensorily exper-
ienced the death of her stillborn fetus could claim emotional dis-
tress along with personal injury, according to the court of ap-
peal. The court found that a stillbirth can foreseeably cause 
emotional injury which would be compensated as part of a 
mother's medical malpractice claim. 
The woman was in labor for twenty-four hours. The attend-
ing physician refused to perform a Caesarean, despite the wo-
man's request. The fetus died in the womb. 
An action was filed pleading two causes of action: Medical 
malpractice, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based 
upon the fetus' death. A demurrer to the latter cause of action 
was sustained without leave to amend. The woman appealed. 
The court of appeal ordered the trial court to allow the wo-
man to amend her first cause of action for personal injuries to 
include damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The ruling was based on an application of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court established a cause of action for emo-
tional distress for a parent witnessing the tortious death of his 
or her child. 
In Dillon, the court stated there were several essential ele-
ments to a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress: (1) the plaintiff and the victim must be closely related; 
(2) the plaintiff must be present at the scene of the accident; 
and (3) the shock to the plaintiff must result from the plaintiff's 
sensory perception of the injury to the victim. The court of ap-
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peal noted that the woman sensorily felt the death of her child 
and that despite the fetal nature of the child, the woman had a 
relationship which met the Dillon requirement. 
The court emphasized the presence of a relationship be-· 
tween the mother and fetus in this case, and the foreseeability 
that emotional distress will result if the fetus' death is caused by 
medical malpractice. 
B. DuTY TO PROTECT FROM RAPE 
1. Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants Found Where 
Danger Foreseeable 
Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 
176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (lst Dist. 1981). Landlords who, despite no-
tice of past criminal activity on their premises, failed to take 
preventive measures to protect tenants from repeated crimes 
were held liable for injuries resulting from a rape. The court of 
appeal held that a landlord has a duty to protect tenants from 
danger where circumstances make criminal activity likely, and 
that rape is foreseeable in some instances. 
The tenant lived in a building located in a high crime area. 
The building lobby was accessible only to tenants, but due to a 
defective front door lock, non-residents could enter. On two 
prior occasions tenants had been mugged in the building. The 
victim had personally notified the landlord of unsafe conditions 
one month before her attack. Despite acknowledging the prob-
lem, the landlord failed to take preventative measures. The ten-
ant was raped and robbed in the building's lobby. 
The trial court sustained the landlord's demurrer without 
leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed, applying O'Hara 
v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. 
Rptr. 487 (1st Dist. 1977), which held that while common law 
principles hold a landlord free of a duty to protect tenants, such 
a duty arises where the landlord has notice of criminal activities 
taking place upon the property. 
Here, the landlords had substantial notice of criminal activ-
ity on their property, yet failed to repair door locks and lighting. 
The court found that the danger of rape, in particular, was fore-
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seeable despite the fact the two previous incidents had been rob-
beries. The court noted that rape, like robbery, is a form of as-
sault, and that the landlords had notice of assaults. In addition, 
the court pointed out that foreseeability does not require identi-
cal events, other jurisdictions have held a landlord liable for a 
first time criminal attack. 
2. Duty of Landlord to Protect Tenant From Rape Not 
Found 
7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. 
App. 3d 901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (2d Dist. 1981), hearing denied, 
July 13, 1981. The court of appeal dismissed a rape victim's 
cause of action for negligence against her landlord. The land-
lord's duty to protect the woman against criminal assault was 
not established. Absent notice of past crimes on the premises, or 
reason to anticipate crime, a landlord has no duty to protect te-
nants from harm, said the court. 
A woman was raped in her apartment. She sued the land-
lord, alleging that because the landlord knew a rapist was oper-
ating in the general area, his failure to provide adequate lighting 
to protect tenants against rape was negligence. The trial court 
had overruled a demurrer. The court of appeal reversed, order~ 
ing the trial court to vacate its ruling. 
The court of appeal noted that the woman's complaint 
failed to indicate a crime had previously occured on the prop-
erty, detail the specific areas where the rapes had occured or 
support her claim that the landlord had notice of rapes in the 
area. Under Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc., 
63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976), a landlord is not 
an insurer of his or her property. 
3. Landlord Not Liable For Tenant's Rape 
Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 
(2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a landlord is not 
liable for injuries to a tenant resulting from inadequate protec-
tion of the premises absent notice of previous criminal activities 
on the property, or reason to anticipate such activities. 
A woman was raped in her apartment by an intruder who 
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gained entry because of inadequate security. Louvered windows 
adjacent to her door made his entry possible. The area around 
the tenant's apartment was totally dark after 1:30 a.m. 
The tenant sued the landlords for negligence, alleging their 
failure to keep the apartment complex safe resulted in her rape. 
The tenant appealed the landlord's grant of summary judgment. 
In O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 
798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977), the court of apperu held that a 
landlord with notice of previous crimes on the property had an 
affirmative duty either to warn tenants, or provide necessary se-
curity where such incidents were likely to reoccur. 
This same duty was found to exist in Kwaitkowski v. Supe-
rior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1st 
Dist. 1981), based upon similar facts. However, in 7735 Holly-
wood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 
901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (2d Dist. 1981), hearing denied, July 13, 
1981, the court found a landlord had no duty to protect tenants. 
In this case, there was no evidence of recent or similar 
crimes on the property. The tenant argued, however, that the 
landlord had attempted to provide security but had done an in-
adequate job. Because the landlord had made a representation 
of safety by providing locks and lights, the tenant argued liabil-
ity existed for a failure to protect the tenant from attack. How-
ever, the court found that locks and lights are not representa-
tions of safety. 
4. Rape of Female Security Guard Not Foreseeable 
Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 3d 37, 176 
Cal. Rptr. 320 (3d Dist. 1982). The court of appeal held that an 
owner/contractor does not have a duty to protect a female secur-
ity.guard from sexual assault. Because no similar criminal as-
saults had occured on the property, the owner could not have 
reasonably foreseen this particular type of injury. 
Wingard was employed by an agency that had contracted 
with the owner to protect a warehouse from theft. While on duty 
in the guardhouse, she was attacked by an intruder and raped. 
There had been no previous history of violent crimes committed 
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on the property, only some thefts. 
The woman sued the owner and contractor alleging negli-
gence in their failure to secure the premises against intruders. 
The victim's employer had written the owner asking that the 
guardhouse be moved. 
The trial court dismissed the victim's action and granted 
summary judgment based upon the absence of a duty on the 
part of the owner and an extension of the fireman's rule. The 
fireman's rule prohibits recovery under the theory that a 
firefighter or police officer voluntarily confronts danger and is 
compensated accordingly through his or her salary. 
The court of appeal affirmed but declined to extend the fire-
man's rule to· security guards. Under Jamison v. Mark C. 
Bloome, 112 Cal. App. 3d 570, 169 Cal. Rptr. 399 (2d Dist. 1980), 
absence of a prior history of specific criminal activities on the 
premises precluded a landlord's liability for failure to anticipate 
that a security guard would be raped, where the only previous 
criminal activity bad been theft. 
Michele Modena-Kurpinsky 
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